This paper investigates the determinants of risk-taking in household portfolios by comparing the asset holdings of Swedish twins. We report a strong positive relation between financial wealth and risk-taking, as measured by participation and the risky share. Among participants, the average elasticity of the risky share with respect to financial wealth is significantly positive and estimated at 22%, which suggests that the average individual investor has decreasing relative risk aversion. The risky share also increases with the risky portfolio's Sharpe ratio, and decreases with leverage, entrepreneurship, household size and a measure of habit. Furthermore, the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share itself is heterogeneous across investors and varies strongly with characteristics. The elasticity decreases with financial wealth and human capital, increases with habit, real estate wealth and household size, and is a hump-shaped function of age. As a result, the response of the aggregate demand for risky assets to exogenous wealth shocks is similar to, but does not coincide with, the response of a representative investor with constant relative risk aversion. We confirm the robustness of our results by running time-differenced instrumental variable regressions, and by controlling for zygosity, lifestyle, mental and physical health, the intensity of communication between twins, and measures of social interactions.
Introduction
Does financial wealth drive the share of risky assets in the portfolio of individual investors? Is the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share homogenous across investors or does it vary with their demographic, financial and portfolio characteristics? How does the aggregate demand for risky assets respond to changes in the wealth distribution? In portfolio choice theory, mechanisms such as habit formation, borrowing constraints, decreasing relative risk aversion, portfolio insurance, or a "capitalist" taste for wealth, all imply that richer households allocate a higher fraction of their financial wealth to risky investments. 1 Furthermore, these theories imply that the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share should vary with household characteristics, including financial wealth itself.
The empirical household finance literature, however, provides only partial evidence on these mechanisms. In cross-sections, richer and more educated investors are known to allocate a higher proportion of their financial wealth to risky assets than less sophisticated households (e.g. Campbell 2006 , Calvet Campbell and Sodini, " CCS" 2007 CCS" , 2009a CCS" , 2009b . 2 In addition, the risky share has a negative cross-sectional relation to real estate holdings (Cocco 2005, Flavin and Yamashita 2002) , leverage (Guiso Jappelli and Terlizzese 1996) , and internal consumption habit (Lupton 2002) . It is unclear, however, whether these variables directly impact portfolio choice, or simply proxy for latent traits such as ability, genes, risk aversion, or upbringing. Several recent papers suggest that panel data offer a possible solution to this identification problem when the characteristic of interest exhibits sufficient time variations (e.g. Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008, CCS 2009a, Chiappori and Paiella 2008) . One difficulty with the dynamic panel approach is that the researcher needs to control for household inertia by using instruments, and the results are sensitive to the validity of the instruments.
In this paper, we consider an alternative estimation strategy based on comparing the financial portfolios held by twins. The analysis is made possible by a novel dataset containing the disaggregated portfolios and detailed characteristics of all twins in Sweden. We observe the worldwide assets owned by each twin at the end of a tax year, including bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks but excluding retirement accounts. 1 For instance, a positive relation between financial wealth and risk-taking originates from an internal habit in Constantinides (1990) , an external habit in Campbell and Cochane (1999) , borrowing constraints in Paxson (1990) , leverage constraints and housing in Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005) , portfolio insurance in Brennan and Schwartz (1988), or a "capitalist" taste for wealth in Carroll (2000 Carroll ( , 2002 . 2 Friend and Blume (1975) , , Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996) , Leape (1987, 1998) , Lupton (2002) , Perraudin and Sørensen (2000) , and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002b).
All holdings are reported at the asset level for the 1999-2002 period.
Our main results are the following. First, we estimate the average financial wealth elasticity of the risky share. As in the earlier literature, we begin by running pooled crosssectional regressions of a household's risky share on its financial wealth and yearly fixed effects. The elasticity of the risky share ranges from 21% in the absence of controls to 23% when a large set of a demographic and financial variables is included. It is an open question whether these cross-sectional estimates capture the direct impact of financial wealth on the risky share, or are instead driven by latent traits, such as risk aversion or ability, that are correlated with financial wealth.
We next consider linear panel specifications with yearly twin pair fixed effects, which is our main innovation. These specifications can be estimated by regressing twin differences in the risky share on twin differences in characteristics. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is measured at 20% in the absence of controls and at 22% in the presence of controls. A 10% proportional increase in a household's financial wealth is therefore associated with a 2.0 − 2.2% proportional increase in its risky share. The adjusted R 2 coefficient is twice higher in the panel regressions with yearly twin pair fixed effects than in the cross-sectional regressions, which confirms that twin pair fixed effects explain a substantial fraction of the observed variation of the risky share.
Second, we investigate the impact of demographic, portfolio, and other financial characteristics on the risky share. In both cross-sectional and twin regressions, the risky share is positively related to the risky portfolio's Sharpe ratio, but is negatively related to leverage, entrepreneurship, the risky's portfolio systematic exposure, household size, and a measure of habit. Income risk and education, which are significant in crosssectional regressions, become insignificant in the twin pair regressions. These findings suggest that in traditional pooled cross-sectional regressions, income risk and education variables capture a fixed effect, for instance related to risk aversion, ability or upbringing, that has no direct effect on the risky share.
Third, we show that the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share itself is heterogeneous across households and varies strongly with characteristics, which, to the best of our knowledge, is also new to the literature. The elasticity strongly decreases with financial wealth and increases with a measure of habit, as theoretical models of habit formation would predict. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share tends to be high for households with low human capital, high real estate wealth, or a large size. Furthermore, the elasticity is a hump-shaped function of age.
Fourth, we verify the robustness of our results to alternative estimation methods and interpretations. We assess the role of zygosity by reestimating the regressions separately on identical and fraternal twins. We obtain similar coefficients, and the predicted variation is substantially higher for identical twins. We investigate the impact of communication between twins on their portfolio allocations by separately reestimating the regressions on the group of twins that communicate frequently and the group of twins that communicate infrequently. While the predicted variation is smaller for twins that communicate frequently, the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is approximately the same in both groups. These results suggest that even though communication attenuates demographic and financial differences, it is unlikely that the positive relation between financial wealth and risk-taking is primarily driven by differences in information. We check the robustness of our results to social interactions by including business and municipality dummies, as well as the average log risky share and financial wealth of other households in the municipality. We also consider the alternative interpretation that risk-tolerant investors happened to have both a high risky share and a high financial wealth at the end of the bull market of the nineties. A twin with high financial wealth in 1999 is found to have a high risky share in 2002, even if one controls for its 1999 risky share. These empirical regularities cannot be explained by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility or inertia alone, and strongly suggest that individual investors exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion.
Fifth, we verify that our results are not contaminated by individual fixed effects specific to each twin in a pair, such as different levels of risk aversion. Since drinking and smoking habits have been previously related to risk tolerance (e.g. Barsky Juster Kimball and Shapiro 1997), one strategy is to expand the twin regressions by including physiological and lifestyle control variables. Another strategy is compute dynamic estimates of the elasticity by following a given household over time. We correct for inertia in portfolio rebalancing by running the instrumental variable regression of changes in a household's log risky share on changes in its log financial wealth. With either method, the elasticity has an average of 23% and decreases with financial wealth, which suggests that the twin difference regressions are not severely contaminated by individual fixed effects. Furthermore, the dynamic panel, cross-sectional and twin difference methods all provide very similar estimates of the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share.
Sixth, we use our micro estimates to compute how the aggregate demand for risky assets responds to exogenous changes in the distribution of financial wealth. We take security prices as fixed. When financial shocks are concentrated on low and medium wealth households, their incremental demand for risky assets is substantial because their risky shares, which are initially low, are highly elastic. In proportional terms, aggregate risky wealth grows almost as quickly as aggregate financial wealth. When instead the wealth shocks are concentrated on the richest, that is on households with low elasticities and high initial risky shares, aggregate risky wealth grows only slightly faster than financial wealth in the entire population. Overall, the elasticity of the aggregate demand for risky assets to a homogenous wealth shock is estimated to be slightly above unity. Thus, the negative relation between financial wealth and the elasticity of the risky share at the micro level implies that the aggregate demand for risky assets is close to, but does not coincide with, the demand of a CRRA representative investor.
Finally, we investigate the decision to participate in risky asset markets. The probability that a household owns risky assets is found to increase with financial wealth and human capital, and to decrease with measures of habit, leverage, and income risk. Education and household size, which are significant in the pooled regression, are insignificant when we control for twin pair fixed effects. We use these results to recompute the aggregate elasticity of the risky share to exogenous wealth changes when entry to or exit from risky asset markets are taken into account.
Twin comparisons are a true and tried method for disentangling family fixed effects from individual characteristics. In labor economics, twin studies have been mostly applied to labor to disentangle the relative effect of education and ability on earnings. 3 A similar approach seems fruitful for household finance. In recent studies, Barnea, Cronqvist and Siegel (2009) and Cesarini et al. (2009a Cesarini et al. ( , 2009b compare the choices of identical and fraternal twins and show that risk aversion is in part an inherited trait. Their findings suggest that the results reported in the present paper control, at least partially, for differences in risk aversion. More generally, data on siblings can be useful in household finance, as exemplified by the recent work of Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2009) showing a positive link between IQ and stockmarket participation.
The dynamic estimates reported in this paper complement several recent empirical studies. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2008) run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of changes in a household's risky share on changes in its financial wealth and other controls, and find no evidence of a link between wealth and risk-taking. Brunnermeier and Nagel reach the same conclusion when they control for measurement error and inertia by instrumenting financial wealth with income growth and inheritance receipts. CCS (2009a) replicate the OLS results of Brunnermeier and Nagel and Chiappori and Paiella. They also consider a different set of instruments, derived from the returns on the assets held by a household at the beginning of a period, and instead find evidence of a positive relation between financial wealth and the risky share. While CCS (2009a) estimate an adjustment model of portfolio rebalancing, the dynamic section of this paper focuses on a slightly more parsimonious, reduced-form specification.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the Swedish dataset. In Section 3, we report cross-sectional and twin regressions of the log risky share on log financial wealth and other characteristics. In Section 4, we estimate how the financial 3 See for instance Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2000) , Behrman and Taubman (1989) , Bronars and Grogger (1994) , and Taubman (1976) . Another influential line of research considers instead adoptees, as in the work of Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006), Björklund, Jäntti, and Solon (2007), Plug and Vijverberg (2003) , and Sacerdote (2002 Sacerdote ( , 2007 . Other contributions on the interplay between genetics and economics include Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and Murray (2002) .
wealth elasticity of the risky share varies with financial wealth itself as well as with other variables. Section 5 investigates the impact of social interactions, health, behavior and age. We also dynamically estimate the elasticity of the risky share in a broad panel of households. In Section 6, we investigate the participation decision in the presence of twin pair fixed effects, and compute the aggregate financial wealth elasticity of the risky share. Section 7 concludes. An Appendix available online (Calvet and Sodini 2009) presents details of data construction and estimation methodology. We observe the zygosity of each twin pair (fraternal or identical), 4 and the intensity of communication between twins. For each twin in the SALT survey, we also observe a set of physiological and lifestyle variables: weight, height, blood pressure, self-assessed physical health, mental health, and smoking, alcohol and coffee habits. We refer the reader to Lichtenstein et al. Swedish Wealth Registry. We have merged the Swedish Twin Registry with the Swedish Wealth Registry, which we have used in earlier work (CCS 2007 (CCS , 2009a (CCS , 2009b . Statistics Sweden has a parliamentary mandate to collect highly detailed information on household finances. We compiled the data supplied by Statistics Sweden into a panel covering four years (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and the entire population of Sweden. The information available on each resident can be grouped into three main categories: demographic characteristics, income, and disaggregated wealth.
The Swedish Dataset
Demographic information includes age, gender, marital status, nationality, birthplace, education, household size, and municipality. The household head is defined as the individual with the highest income. The education variable includes high school and post-high school dummies for the household head.
Income is reported by individual source. For capital income, the database reports the income (interest, dividends) that has been earned on each bank account or each security. For labor income, the database reports gross labor income and business sector.
The panel contains highly disaggregated information on household wealth. We observe the worldwide assets owned by each resident on December 31 of each year, including bank accounts, mutual funds and stocks. The information is provided for each individual account or each security. The database also records contributions made during the year to private pension savings, as well as debt outstanding at year end and interest paid during the year.
The results presented in this paper are based on households that exist throughout the 1999-2002 period. We impose no constraint on the participation status of these households, but require that they satisfy the following financial requirements at the end of each year. First, disposable income must be at least 1,000 Swedish kronor ($113) each year. Second, the value of all financial assets must be no smaller than 3,000 kronor ($339). Third, the household head must be at least 25 years old.
What Drives the Risky Share?
In this section, we analyze the main determinants of risk-taking in household portfolios. We describe the main variables, report cross-sectional evidence with time fixed effects, and then estimate regressions that also control for twin pair fixed effects.
Definitions and Construction of Variables
We will use the following definitions throughout the paper. Cash consists of bank account balances and money market funds. Risky financial assets include directly held stocks and risky mutual funds. For every household h, the risky portfolio is defined as the portfolio of risky financial assets. We measure financial wealth F h,t as the sum of holdings in cash, risky financial assets, capital insurance products, and directly held bonds, excluding from consideration illiquid assets such as real estate or consumer durables, and defined contribution retirement accounts. Also, our measure of wealth F h,t is gross financial wealth and does not subtract mortgage or other household debt.
The risky share w h,t at date t is the weight of risky assets in the household's portfolio of cash and risky financial assets. A participant is a household with a positive risky share. In the rest of this section and in Sections 4 and 5, we examine the determinants of the risky share in the portfolios held by participants. The participation decision is investigated in Section 6.
The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is defined as:
where f h,t = ln(F h,t ) denotes the household's log financial wealth. Portfolio choice theory suggests that the elasticity η h,t is zero if the household has isoelastic utility and there are no market frictions. The elasticity η h,t can be positive, however, if the household exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion or faces leverage constraints. Financial sophistication, family composition, human capital, and habit formation can also impact the risky share. We now explain how we measure these effects.
Leverage. Risk-taking can be impacted by current borrowing, for instance through a mortgage, and the likelihood of facing borrowing constraints in the future. Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), Grossman and Vila (1992) , Paxson (1990) , Teplá (2000) , Cocco (2005) , and Yao and Zhang (2005) develop portfolio choice models with this feature. We measure the effect of borrowing through the leverage ratio, which is defined as total debt divided by the sum of financial and real estate wealth.
Portfolio characteristics. A household's assessment of its investment skills might affect its willingness to invest in risky assets (CCS 2007). We proxy investment competence with the ex-ante Sharpe ratio of the household risky portfolio. The risky share may also be driven by the systematic risk exposure of financial assets, which is measured by the beta coefficient of the risky portfolio. In the appendix we explain the methodology used to estimate the Sharpe ratio and beta.
Family composition. We compute the gross wealth of each adult household member, where gross wealth is defined as the sum of financial and real estate wealth. We define the gender index as the share of the household's gross wealth owned by adult men. 
where L h,t denotes real income in year t, α h is a household fixed effect, x h,t is a vector of characteristics, ν h,t is an idiosyncratic permanent component, and ε h,t is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N (0, σ 2 ε,h ). The permanent component ν h,t follows the random walk:
where ξ h,t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ξ,h ) is the shock to permanent income in period t. The Gaussian innovations ε h,t and ξ h,t are white noise and are uncorrelated with each other at all leads and lags.
We estimate the income process of each household by using its yearly series between 1993 and 2002. Let u h,t denote the difference between the income growth, ln(L h,t /L h,t−1 ), and the fitted value, β 0 (x h,t − x h,t−1 ). We compute the sample correlation ρ h between the income growth innovation u h,t and the historical excess return on the portfolio of risky assets held by the household in year t. Expected human capital is defined by:
where T h denotes the difference between 100 and the age of household h in date t, and π h,t,t+n denotes the probability that the household head h is alive at t + n conditional on being alive at t. We make the simplifying assumption that no individual lives longer than 100. The survival probability is estimated using the life table provided by Statistics Sweden. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a detailed discussion of the estimation of labor income and human capital. We use the following variables in the remaining of the paper: (a) human capital expressed in year t prices; (b) the variance of the transitory component of real income, σ 2 ε,h ; (c) the variance of the permanent component of real income, σ 2 ξ,h ; and (d) the correlation between income and the risky portfolio excess return, ρ h .
Internal and external habit. The risky share can be impacted by lagged values of consumption, either by the household itself or by a peer group. For instance, a large class of additive habit formation models implies that the optimal risky share is of the form:
where w * h,t is the risky share of the CRRA investor, X h,t is the (internal or external) habit, and λ h,t is the shadow value of the habit. In the internal habit model of Constantinides (1990) and the external habit specification of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), λ h,t X h,t represents the cost of supporting the habit over an infinite horizon. Equation (3.2) implies that households have a positive financial wealth elasticity of the risky share. Let y h,t = λ h,t X h,t /F h,t denote the present value of the cost of maintaining the (internal or external) habit relative to financial wealth. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share,
is positive. It is arbitrarily large when financial wealth is close to the present value of the habit, and declines to zero for large values of financial wealth. Since we do not observe individual consumption, we proxy the internal habit of household h at date t by its average disposable income in years t − 2, t − 1 and t, excluding private pension savings from consideration. Similarly, we proxy the external habit by the three-year average income in household h 0 s municipality. The twin sample has been excluded from the households sampled in each peer group.
Cross-Sectional Evidence
In household finance, it is common to consider pooled cross-sections of the risky share:
where δ t is a time fixed effect, f h,t is the log financial wealth of household h, and x h,t is a vector of characteristics. We now examine the evidence on a pooled cross-section of Swedish households.
In the first two columns of Table 1 , we regress a household's log risky share on its log financial wealth and yearly fixed effects. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share, η, is highly significantly positive and estimated at 0.212. The pooled regression has an R 2 coefficient of 9.7%. In unreported work, we have found that R 2 is only 1.6% when time dummies are included but financial wealth is excluded from the pooled regression. Financial wealth therefore explains most of the predicted variation in the risky share.
In the next two columns, we include additional financial variables and demographic characteristics. The estimate of the financial wealth elasticity η increases slightly to 0.222. Real estate wealth, which represents a large fraction of the overall wealth of most households, is cross-sectionally related to the asset allocation of the financial portfolio. The real estate wealth elasticity of the risky share is negative and estimated at −0.005. Its magnitude is much smaller than financial wealth elasticity, but is strongly significant. Households with real estate wealth tend to select lower levels of financial risk. This result confirms the findings of Cocco (2005) , who also finds a negative cross-sectional relation between housing and the risky share in the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This empirical regularity could be explained by the risk of real estate investments, as in the portfolio choice models of Cocco (2005) Households with high leverage ratios tend to select a lower risky share, consistent with the empirical evidence in other countries (e.g. Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese 1996). A high level of debt in kronor, however is associated with a higher risky share. Households with high levels of debt might be more risk-tolerant, which would also explain why they choose leveraged positions of risky assets. Another explanation is that debt is a proxy for financial experience and literacy. Like debt, private pension investing is positively related to the risky share, and could also be a proxy for financial experience.
Portfolio diversification has a strongly significant and positive effect on the risky share. Households with a high Sharpe ratio might be confident in their investment ability and thus take more risk (CCS 2007), or might simply be less risk averse than average. Beta has a significantly negative coefficient. In the cross-section, households with substantial systematic exposure in their risky portfolios tend to select low risky shares.
Education is associated with a higher risky share in the cross-section. Larger households take less financial risk, consistent with the substantial background risk caused by the random needs of the members of a large family. A complementary interpretation is that larger households behave like poorer households of smaller size, as in consumption models based on household equivalence scales (e. In the third set of columns, we add human capital and measures of habit to the set of explanatory variables. Expected human capital has a positive but insignificant relation with the risky share. Income risk, on the other hand, is negatively related, as captured by the negative coefficients on the permanent and transitory components of income. These results are consistent with the findings of Palia, Qi and Wu (2009) The measures of internal and external habit are both negatively related to the risky share, as theory predicts, but with different significance levels. The internal habit is strongly significant: Households with higher average income (a proxy for own consumption habit) are less prone to financial risk. Lupton (2002) obtained a similar result on US consumption data. The external habit coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that income differences across Swedish municipalities provide only limited explanations of the risky share. Our cross-sectional evidence is based on a short history and should be interpreted with caution. External habit-formation models are primarily used to explain time series variations in asset returns and risk premia, not the cross-section of the risky share. Furthermore, given that we regress the risky share on average income, our results may also be due to cash on hand, as in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) .
In the last set of columns of Table 1 , we include dummies for the household's municipality and the household head's industry. These variables may matter because households in different municipalities and business sectors may have access to different information or have different expectations about future economic conditions and stock market performance. We obtain no major difference in the estimated coefficients once we control for these effects.
Overall, our results confirm the cross-sectional findings obtained with other datasets. As in Carroll (2002) , the risky share is substantially larger for households with high financial wealth, which is by far the most significant regressor. Educated households holding a risky portfolio correlated to their labor income tend to take more financial risk, while the risky share is negatively related to real estate wealth, the leverage ratio, family size, internal habit, and income risk. One advantage of the Swedish dataset is that we can simultaneously measure the relation between the risky share and a large number of household characteristics, while earlier research is typically based on fragmentary data. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to combine human capital, leverage, and habit into a single regression. In addition, we also consider the impact of portfolio characteristics and document that in a cross-section, the risky share is positively related to the risky portfolio's Sharpe ratio and negatively related to its systematic risk. We also document that the inclusion of portfolio characteristics does not impact the cross-sectional relations between the risky share and other financial and demographic characteristics.
While compelling, these results are difficult to interpret, because financial wealth and household characteristics play a dual role in the pooled cross sectional regressions (3.4). On the one hand, the regressors may have a direct impact on risk-taking, as financial theory would suggest. On the other hand, household characteristics can be viewed as proxies for a latent fixed effect. One might consider resolving these issues by including a household fixed effect in (3.4) . This is difficult to do in practice, however, because important variables such as gender and education are either constant or very persistent, and therefore difficult to distinguish from a fixed effect. Even when there is sufficient variation, one must control for inertia, as will be explained in Section 5.5. The Swedish twin dataset offers the possibility of an alternative estimation strategy, which we now explain.
Twin Regressions
We assume that for every twin pair i, the risky share of each twin j can be expressed as:
The intercept α i,t is a fixed effect specific to twin pair i in year t. It captures the impact of time, stock market performance, genes, shared background, common upbringing, and expected inheritance, among others. Specification (3.5) can be estimated using standard panel techniques. Equivalently, we can difference the two equations and estimate by OLS:
where ∆ j (y i,j,t ) = y i,2,t − y i,1,t denotes the twin difference of a variable y, and ε i,t = ε i,2,t − ε i,1,t . Both methods provide the same estimates and t−statistics of η and γ, but they have different R 2 coefficients. To facilitate comparison with the pooled crosssectional regressions, we will report the R 2 coefficient for specification (3.5) . Twin difference regressions (3.6) have substantially lower R 2 coefficients than (3.5), as one would expect if pair fixed effects are important.
In first two columns of Table 2 , we regress the risky share on financial wealth and yearly twin pair fixed effects. Financial wealth has a strong positive coefficient, and the estimated elasticity η is now 0.196, as compared to 0.212 in the pooled regression reported in Table 1 . The elasticity of the risky share with respect to financial wealth is estimated at 0.212 when we include financial and demographic characteristics (second set of columns), 0.221 when we add human capital, income risk and habit measures (third set), and 0.218 when we also include municipality and industry dummies (last set of columns). These estimates are remarkably stable and confirm the findings from cross-sectional regressions that the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is strictly positive and close to 0.22.
The twin regressions confirms some of the other main results of the pooled crosssections. Households with real estate holdings, leverage, large family size, risky assets with high systematic exposure or a high habit, tend to take less financial risk. Diversification and proxies for financial experience and sophistication are positively related to the risky share, while expected human capital is insignificant. The positive impact of the Sharpe ratio confirms the explanation proposed in CCS 2007 that households are more prone to purchase risky assets when they are more competent about stockmarket investing. One interesting difference between pooled and twin regressions is that education and income risk are significantly related to the risky share in the cross-section, but are insignificant in the twin regression. Education variables have sample standard deviations of similar magnitudes in the level and twin differences. These findings suggest that education and income risk capture a fixed effect in traditional cross-sectional regressions, but have no direct relation to the risky share. For instance, education could capture the impact of ability and upbringing, while income risk could be correlated with risk tolerance. Risk tolerant, able individuals may engage in risky professions and select high levels of risk-taking and education, consistent with the cross-sectional evidence. The twin regressions suggest, however, that education and income risk have no direct bearing on the asset allocation decision.
Yearly twin pair fixed effects and financial wealth explain most of the predicted variation in the risky share. The adjusted R 2 coefficient, which equals 9.7% in the pooled cross-section of the risky share on financial wealth, increases to 18.0% in the presence of yearly twin pair fixed effects, and to 22.8% when all other characteristics are included as explanatory variables.
Our estimates of the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share can be readily interpreted in the context of habit formation models. Since the average elasticity is η ≈ 0.2, we infer from (3.3) that the present value of maintaining the (internal or external) habit relative to financial wealth is approximately η/(1 + η) ≈ 1/6. The habit represents on average one sixth of the household's financial wealth.
We conduct a number of robustness checks in the Appendix. First, we consider the impact of zygosity, and document that the variance of the risky share is substantially smaller within pairs of identical twins than within pairs of fraternal twins. We also reestimate the yearly twin pair regressions separately on monozygotic and dizygotic twins. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is estimated at 0.17 for monozygotic twins and 0.227 for dizygotic twins, and adjusted R 2 coefficients are 31.4% and 21.7%, respectively 5 . Consistent with intuition, yearly twin pair fixed effects and financial wealth capture a higher fraction of the observed variation of the risky share when we focus on identical twins. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is close 0.2 in both groups, and remains strongly significant despite the smaller size of each subsample.
Second, it is sometimes suggested that genetic effects matter less with age. In the Appendix, we classify twin pairs by age and reestimate the twin regressions in each group. The financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is 0.161 for twins younger than 35, 0.246 for twins between 35 and 45, 0.211 for twins between 45 and 55, and 0.181 for twins above 55. The elasticity remains significantly positive for all groups and is hump-shaped with age. The effect of other characteristics is generally robust, but tends to be less significant due to the smaller size of the groups. Leverage, family size, income risk, and (external and internal) habit have a negative impact on the risky share. The correlation between the income growth innovation and the risky portfolio return, ρ h , is positively related to risk-taking in two age groups (35 −45 and above 55) and negatively related in the other two (less than 25 and 45 − 55). Furthermore, the correlation effect is strongly significant only for the older group.
Third, communication between twins may create additional difficulties. For example, the insignificant education coefficients can be interpreted as evidence that education cannot explain risk-taking, or alternatively that twin communicate frequently enough to overcome the impact of education differences on their risk-taking behavior. In the Appendix, we separately reestimate our regressions on the set of twins that communicate rarely and the set of twins that communicate often. The regression coefficients reported for each group are remarkably similar to the ones reported in Table 2 . Interestingly, the adjusted R 2 for twins with infrequent contacts is more than double the R 2 for twins that communicate often, suggesting that communication tends to reduce differences in risk-taking. We leave to future research the investigation of such issue.
Fourth, we have so far assumed that individual choices are driven by individual preferences and characteristics, and we have devoted only limited attention to the potential impact of social interactions. Because residents in different areas of Sweden may imitate the asset allocation of their neighbors, we have included municipality and business dummies in the last column of Tables 1 and 2 , and we have verified that these variables do not impact our main results. In the Appendix, we provide further evidence on the role of local interactions. We report that the standard deviation of the risky share (in logs or in levels) within Swedish municipalities is at least five times larger than the standard deviation of the average risky share between municipalities, which suggests that local interactions are not the main drivers of risk-taking. We also reestimate the twin difference regressions by including as controls the average log risky share and the average log financial wealth of households in the same municipality, while keeping municipality fixed effects as controls. The financial wealth elasticity is again estimated at 0.22, and the main results of Table 2 remain unchanged. The log risky share has a positive and significant coefficient of about 0.76. This result should be taken with caution, since regressing a variable on group means is fraught with difficulties (e.g. Manski, 1993) . We leave the full investigation of this topic for further research.
Our findings on communication and social interactions complement earlier research on the link between information and risk-taking (e.g. Guiso and Jappelli 2006; Peress 2004) . At the same time, we conclude that social interactions and information asymmetries are unlikely to fully drive the positive relation between financial wealth and risk-taking. In the above analysis, we have not controlled for individual fixed effects that are specific to each twin and impact the risky share in addition to the pair fixed effect. We provide a detailed treatment of this issue in Section 5.
What Drives the Financial Wealth Elasticity of the Risky Share?
We have so far assumed that the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is identical across households, and we have estimated it by regressing twin differences of the risky share on twin differences of financial wealth. Financial theory suggests, however, that the elasticity can vary with household characteristics, including financial wealth. For this reason, we now investigate the determinants of the elasticity of the risky share. We consider the extended specification:
where η i,t is pair-dependent. We will allow η i,t to be a function of the characteristics of the pair. 6 In Table 3 , we classify twin pairs into quartiles of the average log financial wealth f i,t = (f i,1,t + f i,2,t )/2, and estimate the elasticity of the risky share in each bin. We do not include any other characteristics in the first set of columns. The measured elasticity is 0.29 in the first financial wealth quartile, 0.22 in the second quartile, 0.15 in the third quartile, and 0.10 in the fourth quartile. The elasticity η i,t is therefore a decreasing function of financial wealth f i,t . In the second set of columns of Table 3 , we also include all the other characteristics as controls. The estimates of elasticity in each quartile increase slightly, but the elasticity still decreases strongly with financial wealth.
We next assume that the elasticity is a linear function of log financial wealth and other characteristics:
where x i,t denotes the average vector of characteristics in pair i. The variables f i,t and x i,t are demeaned year by year. This specification implies:
which can be estimated by running an OLS regression of
, and ∆ j (x i,j,t ).
In a habit formation model, the elasticity (3.3) increases with the habit and decreases with financial wealth. In the first set of columns of Table 4 , we therefore consider that the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is driven by these two variables. The elasticity of the risky share is a decreasing function of financial wealth and an increasing function of the habit. The first result is consistent with the bin regressions in Table 3 , while the second result is new. Our findings are readily interpreted. We loglinearize η h,t around ln(y h,t ) and obtain:
where η 1 =η 2 /e ln(y h,t ) . Sinceη ≈ 0.2, we infer that η 1 ≈ 0.24. In regression (1) of Table  4 , we have estimated that the coefficient of financial wealth and the habit are −0.091 and 0.13, respectively. These estimates are approximately the negative of each other, and their magnitudes are about half of the predicted theoretical values. Our analysis is of course a rough assessment of habit formation, since our measures of habit and financial wealth are contaminated by measurement error and we have ignored substantial nonlinearities in financial wealth and other characteristics. We leave the full assessment of the microeconomic implications of habit formation for further research.
In the second set of columns of Table 4 , we allow the elasticity to depend on the full set of demographic and financial characteristics. The elasticity decreases with financial wealth and human capital, and increases with real estate wealth and leverage. Family size not only has a direct negative impact on the risky share but also increases the elasticity of financial wealth. Larger households have lower effective wealth and are in fact behaving like poorer households of smaller size. It is noteworthy that human capital, whose direct impact on the risky share is insignificant, becomes significant when it is interacted with financial wealth. The risky portfolio's Sharpe ratio and systematic exposure have a significant direct impact on the risky share but do not affect the elasticity with respect to financial wealth.
Robustness Checks

Measurement Error
Because financial wealth is observed with measurement error, we now consider an instrumental variable estimation of the twin specification (3.5). We begin with some definitions. The passive risky return r h,t is the proportional change in value of a household's risky portfolio if the household does not trade risky assets during the year. Log passive financial wealth is defined as:
In Table 5 , we instrument log financial wealth with log passive financial wealth. In the first set of columns, we consider a constant elasticity η and estimate it at 0.29, which is slightly higher than the values reported in earlier tables. Thus, the presence of measurement error causes our OLS estimates to exhibit a downward bias.
In the second set of columns of Table 5 , we estimate separate values of the elasticity η in different financial wealth quartiles. Consistent with Section 4, the measured elasticity strongly decreases with financial wealth. We also observe that the impact of our other characteristics is qualitatively unchanged, but internal habit has a negative significant impact on the risky share compared to the OLS twin difference regressions reported in Tables 2 to 4 . Overall, the empirical regularities documented in Sections 3 and 4 do not seem to be invalidated by the presence of measurement error in financial wealth.
Impact of Lagged Financial and Portfolio Characteristics
Consistent with earlier research, we have shown that there is a positive relation between financial wealth and the risky share. One interpretation of this result, which we have emphasized until now, is that richer households tend to select a higher risky share. An alternative interpretation, however, is that at the end of the bull market of the nineties, investors with high equity investments happened to have larger financial wealth than other households. In an economy populated with CRRA investors, we would indeed observe a positive cross-sectional correlation between the risky share and financial wealth after a prolonged period of positive excess stock returns.
In order to distinguish between these two explanations, we define the passive risky share w p h,t as the risky share at the end of year t if the household does not trade risky assets during the year. The passive share is given by:
where r h,t is the passive return on the risky portfolio previously defined. The passive change in the log risky share is then defined as ln(w p h,t ) − ln(w h,t−1 ). These definitions readily extend to periods of inactivity of n years.
In Table 6 , we report twin regressions of the log risky share in 2002 on the usual characteristics and: (a) the log risky share in 1999; (b) the passive change in the log risky share between 1999 and 2002; (c) log financial wealth in 1999; and (d) the passive change in log financial wealth. The coefficient of the risky share and its passive change are both positive and significant, which confirms that the propensity to take risk is persistent over time and that there is inertia in portfolio rebalancing.
Perhaps more importantly, we obtain that 1999 log financial wealth has a positive and significant coefficient. That is, richer households in 1999 have a higher risky share in 2002, even when we control for their risky share at the end of 1999. This result is important, because one would not expect it to hold if investors have CRRA utilities (with or without inertia). In the CRRA specification, risk-tolerant investors have high financial wealth in 1999 because of the bull market, a high risky share in 1999, and therefore a high risky share in 2002. We thus expect a positive relation between the risky share in 1999 and 2002. This mechanism cannot explain, however, the positive relation between the 1999 financial wealth and the 2002 risky share. We conclude that the measured positive relation between financial wealth and risk-taking is not mechanically implied by the bull market of the 1990's. Instead, it suggests that individual investors exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion and inertia in portfolio rebalancing.
Health and Lifestyle
Twin difference regressions may be contaminated by individual fixed effects that are specific to each twin in the pair. For instance, twins may have different levels of risk aversion. One strategy is to include additional control variables that are known to be related to risk aversion. For instance, Barsky et al. (1997) show that risk aversion and asset allocation decisions are related to behavioral variables such as smoking and drinking.
In Table 7 , we include as controls data on the lifestyle and physical and mental health of each twin. Because we have only obtained these variables for the SALT survey, we reestimate the risky share regression on the subset of twins born between 1886 and 1958. The empirical regularities documented in Sections 3 and 4 are robust to the inclusion of these new variables. The average financial wealth elasticity of the risky share is again estimated at 0.21. The new control variables are mainly insignificant at the 5% level, but this is partly due to the fact that we are using a smaller number of observations. Alcohol drinking is positively related to risk-taking, but the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. High blood pressure and depression symptoms have a negative impact at higher significance levels. Coffee drinking, tobacco, regular physical exercise, height, and weight have insignificant coefficients. In unreported work we find that the adjusted R 2 increases only marginally when the physiological and lifestyle characteristics are added to the pooled cross sectional regression whether or not we control for yearly pair fixed effects. Overall, these new regressions confirm the robustness of our results, and also show that risk-taking is positively related to alcohol consumption and negatively related to depression and high blood pressure.
Dynamic Panel Estimation
We can also control for individual fixed effects by following over time the risky share of a given household (e.g. Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008; Chiappori and Paiella 2008; CCS 2009a). Given the specification ln(w h,t ) = δ 0,t + α h + ηf h,t + ε h,t , we eliminate the household fixed effect by taking the first time-difference:
This estimation method can naturally be applied to any subsample of households in the overall Swedish population, and not simply households with a twin. As discussed in CCS (2009a), the estimation of (5.1) must control for two related problems. First, because households display inertia in household rebalancing, we need to include variables that capture passive variations in the risky share. Second, the regressor ∆ t (f h,t ) and the error term ∆ t (ε h,t ) are correlated in equation (5.1), since the innovation ε h,t−1 has an impact on the following period's financial wealth f h,t . A natural solution is to instrument changes in financial wealth.
In the first set of columns of Table 8 , we estimate the specification:
We instrument changes in financial wealth, ∆ t (f h,t ), and changes in the passive risky share, ∆ t ln(w p h,t ), with: (a) the change in financial wealth in the absence of period t − 1 rebalancing, φ(F h,t−1 , w p h,t−1 , r h,t , r f,t ) − f h,t−1 ; 7 and (b) the period t − 1 log passive risky share, ln(w p h,t−1 ). In CCS (2009a), we have followed a similar method to estimate an adjustment model of portfolio rebalancing, in which the financial wealth elasticity of the target risky share is assumed to be constant.
The elasticity of the risky share with respect to financial wealth is estimated at 0.22. This result is consistent with the twin difference regressions of Section 3, and is also in line with the financial wealth elasticity of the target risky share reported in CCS (2009). The change in the log passive share has a significant and positive coefficient, which confirms that there is inertia in household portfolio rebalancing.
In the second set of columns, we let η vary across financial wealth quartiles, which is a methodological innovation. As in the twin difference regressions, the wealth elasticity of the risky share strongly decreases with financial wealth itself. The coefficient of ∆ t ln(w p h,t ) is significantly positive in both specifications, which confirms the presence of inertia in portfolio rebalancing.
In the third and fourth set of columns, we reestimate these specifications in the presence of all controls. We use the level of these controls at the end of year t − 1 in order to avoid endogeneity problems. The average elasticity of the risky share slightly increases to 0.23, and the elasticity is still a strongly decreasing function of financial wealth.
The dynamic panel estimation confirms all the main results of the twin difference regressions. The two approaches are strongly complementary. The dynamic method controls for household fixed effects, but requires valid instruments, which is a source of concern. The technical complexity of dynamic models might hamper their applicability to a large class of explanatory variables. While dynamic panel estimation requires instruments, twin difference equations can be estimated by OLS. Furthermore, the results 7 The instrument coincides with the passive log return on the complete portfolio,
of the section suggest that twin difference regression are not severely contaminated by household fixed effects.
Participation and Aggregate Implications
In the previous sections, we have focused on households that own risky assets. We now investigate the decision to participate in risky assets markets, and provide estimates of the elasticity of the aggregate risky share to changes in the wealth distribution.
Determinants of the Participation Decision
We begin by measuring the cross-sectional correlation between participation, financial wealth, and other characteristics. In the first two columns of Table 9 , we run a pooled logit regression of the participation regression on household characteristics:
Richer households with high human capital and education are more likely to own risky assets. The effect of financial wealth is especially significant. Households with other experience of financial markets, for instance because they have debt or invest in the private pension system, are also more likely to participate. Conversely, participation is less likely for larger households that have a high leverage ratio, a high external or internal habit, or high income risk. In the third set of two columns of Table 9 , we report the results of a logit regression with yearly twin pair fixed effects:
Financial wealth, human capital, and proxies for financial experience all have strong positive coefficients, while leverage, income risk and the external habit have negative coefficients. Interestingly, some of these variables, such as the external habit, have stronger magnitudes that in the cross-sectional regression. Internal habit, education, and household size are now insignificant. The results of the fixed effect regression is that financial wealth is once again a strong determinant of risk-taking. As in Section 3, the impact of leverage, human capital, habit, and income risk is also significant. Our findings thus that confirm some of the main theories of financial market participation (e.g. Calvet, Gonzalez-Eiras and Sodini, 2004; Heaton and Lucas 1999; Vissing-Jørgensen 2002a) still hold when one controls for yearly twin pair fixed effects.
Aggregate Implications
We now investigate how exogenous changes in household financial wealth can impact the aggregate demand for risky assets. We take asset prices are fixed and neglect general equilibrium effects, local interactions, and changes in the habit. At the end of a given year, households are characterized by their risky share w h , their log financial wealth f h = ln(F h ), and their other characteristics x h . For simplicity, we neglect time indices in this section. We consider an exogenous change in the cross-sectional distribution of financial wealth, which for every household h is specified by the growth rate ∆(f h ).The household's new financial wealth is therefore F 0 h = F h e ∆(f h ) . We focus for now on the set of households that initially hold risky assets, and do not consider participation changes. Let F denote the aggregate financial wealth of participants, and F R = P h w h F h the aggregate wealth invested in risky assets. We define the elasticity of aggregate risky wealth as:
Since prices are exogenous, ξ quantifies how the aggregate demand for risky assets responds to exogenous changes in aggregate wealth. We will see that ξ generally depends on the individual growth rates ∆(f 1 ), ..., ∆(f H ), and not simply on the aggregate growth rate ∆ ln(F ).
If the aggregate demand for risky assets is driven by a representative agent with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the aggregate risky share F R /F is constant, and the elasticity is equal to unity: ξ = 1. We also consider micro-level imputation methods that use the initial share w h of each household. After the wealth shock, the risky share is given by:
where η h denotes the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share considered in earlier sections. We consider three possible choices for the elasticity η h :
• η h = 0 for all h, as is the case where each household has its own CRRA utility;
• η h = η > 0 for all h, that is, households have a positive identical financial wealth elasticity of the risky share;
• η h = η(f h , x h ) for all h, which corresponds to the case where the elasticity of each household is a linear function of its financial wealth and characteristics.
The scenario η h = 0 implicitly assumes that households have heterogeneous risk aversion coefficients, which determine their initial risky share w h . We can easily verify that the elasticity ξ is equal to unity if all households have the same initial risky share (w 1 = ... = w H ). We will see, however, that ξ can be either larger or smaller than 1 when households have heterogeneous initial shares. In the scenario η h = η > 0, the constant elasticity is obtained from the yearly twin difference regression of the risky share on log financial wealth. In the last scenario, the linear elasticity η(f h , x h ) is obtained by also including characteristics as regressors. It is the most plausible specification given the micro-level evidence of Section 4. 8 In Figure 1 , we consider 20 financial wealth quantiles, and report for each quantile the value of ξ corresponding to an exogenous wealth shock that affects only households in the quantile: ∆(f h ) = g if h in the quantile, and ∆(f h ) = 0 otherwise. All the results are reported for year 2001 and in the Appendix we show that the results are qualitatively similar in other years. The yellow line corresponds to the benchmark representative investor. The aggregate risky wealth F 0 R = P h w 0 h F 0 h and the elasticity ξ are higher when the wealth increase is concentrated on households with higher initial risky share. For this reason, when households have heterogeneous but fixed levels of risk aversion (green line), the elasticity ξ is monotonic, is less than 1 for low and medium quantiles and exceeds unity only for the very top quantiles. When households have a strictly positive elasticity η (pink line), risky financial wealth grows faster, as one would expect, and reaches 1.4 for the highest quantile. When instead the elasticity is a linear function of financial wealth (blue line), the aggregate demand for risky assets has an elasticity that remains close to unity for a wide range of middle quantiles. For high quantiles, however, the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share of individual households is close to zero, and the aggregate elasticity ξ coincides almost exactly with the aggregate elasticity of the heterogeneous CRRA investors. Thus, the linear elasticity specification is consistent with micro evidence, and generates an aggregate demand for risky assets that can be approximately represented by, but does not exactly coincide with, a CRRA representative investor.
We next investigate participation effects. Let N denote the set of households that do not initially participate in financial markets. The probability that a household participates is given by the yearly cross-sectional logit model Λ(f h ; x h ). The probability that a household in N enters is 0 if ∆f h ≤ 0, and is otherwise:
If the household enters, we assume that it selects the risky share w 0 h = w(f h + ∆f h ; x h ), which is imputed from the cross-sectional regression of the log risky share on characteristics. Aggregate risky financial wealth is then Figure 2 , we illustrate the elasticity of aggregate risky wealth with respect to aggregate financial wealth in the population of participating and nonparticipating twins. By a slight abuse of notation, this new elasticity is also denoted by ξ. In low quantiles, participation is low, so ξ is close to zero for all imputation methods. With the linear elasticity method (blue line), poor investors have a higher elasticity of the risky share η than average, so ξ tends to be higher than with the constant elasticity method (pink line). The linear elasticity eventually goes down and the two lines cross. Because rich investors have an elasticity η close to zero, they behave like heterogeneous CRRA investors. Thus, the linear elasticity specification, which was estimated in Section 4, implies that the aggregate elasticity ξ is close to unity on a wide range of wealth quantiles.
We also investigate the impact of homogenous shocks to the wealth distribution: ∆(f h ) = g for all h. When investor have CRRA utilities, the elasticity ξ is 1 when the set of participants is fixed, and 1.02 in 2001 when entry or exit is taken into account. The corresponding estimates are 1.22 and 1.25 when households have a constant η, and 1.07 and 1.1 when households have a linear elasticity η(f h , x h ).
Overall, this section illustrates the benefits of considering a risky share specification in which the elasticity η(f h , x h ) decreases with financial wealth. First, this approach is empirically consistent with micro data, as was shown in Section 4. Second, such a specification generates an aggregate demand for risky assets that is consistent, but does not exactly coincide, with the demand of a representative agent with CRRA utility. Third, the aggregate elasticity of such a group of investors is remarkably stable, whether one considers homogenous shocks or shocks that only affect a concentrated group of households. We anticipate that these results will stimulate further research on the specification of the representative agent. For instance, it is open question if the deviations from the CRRA benchmark are negligible or could instead be used to provide support for alternative benchmarks, such as the aggregate habit formation models of Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . Our estimates could also have implications for consumption-based asset pricing. We leave these questions for further research.
Conclusion
The determinants of risk-taking have been the subject of an extensive literature in portfolio choice theory and empirical household finance. In this paper, we have used a novel empirical methodology, the comparison of the portfolios held by twins, to investigate the risky share and its elasticity with respect to financial wealth. We have considered an unprecedented set of control variables, including portfolio characteristics, real estate wealth, debt, leverage, human capital, labor income risk, household size, age, and measures of internal and external habit. The average elasticity of the risky share with respect to financial wealth is estimated at 22%.
This paper confirms that the findings of several strands of the literature are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of twin pair fixed effects. Most explanatory variables have a similar impact on the risky share in the cross-sectional and twin difference regressions. The risky share is positively related to diversification and financial experience, and negatively related to income risk, real estate, leverage, household size and a measure of habit. Education, however, significantly affects the risky share in the cross section but becomes insignificant in the twin difference regression.
We document substantial heterogeneity in the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share across households. The elasticity decreases with financial wealth and human capital, is unaffected by education and diversification, and increases with leverage and a measure of habit. The present value of the cost of maintaining the habit represents 1/6 of financial wealth on average, but is higher for poorer households.
Intuition suggests that twin pair fixed effects control for factors such as genes, ability, risk aversion, common upbringing, or expected inheritance. One might worry, however, that twin difference regressions may be contaminated by fixed effects that are specific to each twin in the pair. We confirm our findings by regressing time variations of a household's log risky share on time variations of its log financial wealth. We also verify that our results are unchanged when we control for communication between twins and variables typically associated with risk taking, like drinking, smoking behavior, and other lifestyle and physiological characteristics.
Our household-level results provide support for decreasing relative risk aversion, habit formation, and a negative relation between financial wealth and the financial wealth elasticity of the risky share. We also consider exogenous shocks to the wealth distribution, and show that the aggregate demand for risky assets behave close to, but does not coincide with, the aggregate demand of a representative investor with CRRA utility. In further research, it would be interesting to examine if these deviations provide support for alternative benchmarks, such as the aggregate habit formation models of Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999 
TABLE 8. IV ESTIMATION OF YEARLY CHANGES IN THE LOG RISKY SHARE Random sample of households
Notes: This table reports the IV regression of changes in the log risky share on changes in financial wealth, changes in the log passive share, and household characteristics. The estimation is based on households that participate in risky asset markets at the end of two consecutive years. Yearly fixed effects are included in all the regressions. Log human capital and the leverage ratio are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Characteristics are taken at the beginning of the year and are the same as in Table 1 Notes: This table reports the pooled logit regression of a household's decision to participate in risky asset markets. The cross-sectional regressions are based on all Swedish households with an adult twin, and are run without and with characteristics (first two sets of columns). In the last sets of columns, we report a logit regression with a twin pair fixed effect. Yearly fixed effects are included in all regressions. The education, entrepreneur and unemployment dummies are computed for the twin in the household. All other characteristics are computed at the household level. Log human capital and the leverage ratio are winsorized at the 99th percentile.
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